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To mark the 750 th anniversary of the battle, the strategies and leadership displayed in the field during the four or so hours over which it was fought have received fresh historical attention. Previously overlooked chronicle and letter accounts of the battle have been brought together to give a clearer picture of the winning combination of archery, infantry and cavalry tactics deployed by quick-thinking English captains. The Scottish leaders' fatal choice of poor ground and tactics have also become apparent, providing a strong contrast to Robert I's masterful exploitation of the terrain around Stirling in 1314. 2 The Scottish Historical Review, Volume LXXX, 2: No. 210: October 2001, 157-180 MICHAEL A. PENMAN is Lecturer in Scottish History at the University of Stirling. He is grateful to Norman Macdougall, Michael Brown and Stephen Boardman for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
But a further factor central to any explanation of the 'joyous' English victory, and the terrible cost of Scottish defeat, was the turbulent background of Scottish crown-magnate politics in the years preceding the battle. In the first five years of his active adult rule, after seven years as an adolescent in exile in northern France, David II was able to reward and win the loyal support of an impressive majority of the Scottish magnate community: most of these Scots stuck by him in battle, being either slain or captured at his side. Yet the heavy price of building up this support for the personal monarchy of the second Bruce king was the dangerous alienation of a smaller group of key Scottish nobles.
In autumn 1346 the desertion from David's host by three magnates in particular -with their armed followings in tow -must have had a fatally compromising effect upon any chance that superior Scottish numbers (almost 2:1) could have won the day. Both English and Scottish chroniclers concur in stating that at the muster of the northern contingent of the Scottish host at Perth in late September 1346, William, Earl of Ross, murdered sacrilegiously a local rival and then fled. The campaign went ahead, but at the crucial moment, when the tide of battle seemed to turn against the Scots on 17 October, Robert the Steward, David II's nephew and heir presumptive, along with Patrick Dunbar, Earl of March, withdrew the third and last Scottish division from the fray, perhaps -as Alexander Grant has suggested -taking with them most of the Scottish army's riderless horses and without ever engaging the enemy. The contemporary Lanercost chronicler almost spat that:
if one was worthless, the other was nothing … [the Steward] overwhelmed by cowardice, broke his promise to God that he would never wait for the first blow in battle, and he fled with [March] . Turning their backs, these two fled valiantly with their force and entered Scotland unscathed, and so they led the dance, leaving David to dance his own tune. 3 But in 1346 can the charge of dangerous political brinkmanship in domestic politics be added to those of David's youth, over-confidence and military inexperience? Had the king given these men absolutely no reason to stay and fight for him?
In early June 1341, David II, aged seventeen, returned from his refuge at Château Gaillard in Normandy to a Scottish kingdom in which Robert Steward as king's lieutenant (or 'guardian' according to the chroniclers), along with several other young, ambitious Scottish knights, had recovered all but a residue of Scottish territory and castles from Anglo-Balliol occupation. In this company, the young king had his work cut out to assert his personal Bruce stamp over government and the continued prosecution of war.
Tensions between David and his close advisors on the one hand and the Steward on the other had already become apparent during his exile. David's chief counsellor, John Randolph, Earl of Moray and Lord of Annandale, second son of Sir Thomas Randolph the Guardian (1329-32), had challenged the Steward's lieutenancy and control of royal finances at a heated Parliament in Fife in 1335. After 1338, David and his court in exile in France had sought to direct Scottish domestic and diplomatic affairs, over-riding the Steward. 4 Now in mid-1341 David, young and childless, returned to find that his heir presumptive and nephew, the Steward, who was eight years his senior, had at least three healthy infant sons and a large armed following drawn not only from his own Clydeside lands and west coast allies like the Campbells of Lochawe, but from many Lowland Scots from whom he had otherwise taken homage in David's name since 1338. The Steward had also amassed considerable experience of national leadership in war and administration and begun to expand his territorial interests in the regional vacuums created by the fighting.
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So suspicious of each other had David and the Steward become that it is possible they avoided one another after the royal party made a surprisingly low-key landfall in Scotland about 2 June 1341 at Inverbervie on the Angus coast, just north of Dundee. In his first few weeks of ayres, the king clearly limited his movements to a comfort-zone in the north-east which had sustained his court in exile and where close supporters such as his aunt, Christian Bruce, widow of Sir Fordun, ii, 350; Chron. Bower (Watt), vii, 107-09, 145; ER, i, 435-6; R. Nicholson, Scotland: The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1974) , 132-40. 5 S. Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and Robert III, 1371 -1406 (East Linton, 1996 M. Penman, The Bruce Dynasty in Scotland: David II, 1329-71 (East Linton, forthcoming) , ch. 2. 6 RRS, vi, Chron. Wyntoun, vi, 136; Chron. Bower (Watt), vii, By the time the Estates had assembled there, however, David was three months into a programme of renewed royal patronage and attempts to assume personal sway over the Scots in war. His resettlement of lands and offices between 1341 and 1346 was from the first characterised by a desire to attract for the Crown the support and loyalty of noticeably lesser magnates, knights and esquires, men who had fought for the Bruce Scots since 1332 and in some cases earned a strong reputation as 'flowers of chivalry'. David sought to use patronage to draw these men to look to the Crown -much in the way his father had done after Bannockburn -so as to ensure that he had loyal men in place in the localities. But he also looked to a good many men as a counter-balance to what he by now perceived as the unreasonable influence of selfinterested magnates like the Steward and Ross. Yet, at the outset, as Michael Brown has recently shown, this involved a necessary admission by David that the regional influence of certain up-coming men, established using potent military lordship to exploit the power vacuums resulting from war in the 1330s, could not be ignored by the Crown if it was to secure sufficient allies to overawe both internal and external opponents.
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So it was that much of David's early favour was given to Sir William Douglas of Lothian, a third cousin and pretender to the role of the good Sir James Douglas (d. 1330), essentially validating William's displacement of Anglo-Balliol control of much of the Lothians and the east and middle marches since 1338. David allowed Douglas and his kindred to maintain control of the key offices of sheriff and castle-keeper at Edinburgh and sheriff of Perth, as well as general control of the Douglas This was an early indication that David's patronage was to be calculating, attuned to balancing magnate interests in the various regions of Scotland. Yet his favour must have seemed utterly divisive and partisan in the eyes of established lords like the Steward. For whilst the latter found himself frozen out of royal favour despite his war service as lieutenant, David continued to shower favour on other, lesser knights, many of them among his circle of relatives and close friends, often serving within the royal household, with others obviously lifted out of the Steward's army of the late 1330s. Over the course of the next five years, David's favour to these men -as well as to the secular prelates, monastic houses and burghs of Scotland -amounted to an impressive resettlement after the disruption of the 1330s, bringing in theory considerable loyalty to the Bruce regime and effective delegation of Crown offices in the localities.
Yet inevitably this resettlement was regionally uneven and took hold best in the east-coast Lowlands, the royal heartlands. However, in central Scotland, the south-west, south-east and the Borders, David's patronage was arguably far more complex and fragmented, with particular men receiving lands in several regions, often perhaps as a deliberate royal check on other magnates. Sir Maurice Murray of Drumsregard, sheriff of Lanark -who had commanded a Scottish division for the Steward at the siege of Stirling -was granted its keeping along with the Lanarkshire barony of Stonehouse, as well as Sprouston and Hawick baronies in Roxburghshire (which last two Robert I had given to his own bastard son, Robert, and the Good Sir James Douglas respectively): all of these lands could be said to border along Steward holdings. 12 Sir Malcolm Fleming of Biggar, keeper of Dumbarton castle, David's 'foster-father' who had helped the child king escape to France in 1334, received confirmation of all his lands in the west but also a hereditary grant of a regality earldom of Wigtown on 9 November 1341. In early 1342 Fleming received another grant in this former Comyn-Balliol stronghold, namely the barony of Mochrum in Wigtownshire, lands recently owned by Alexander Bruce, Earl of Carrick, killed in 1333, but held since then by Patrick Dunbar, Earl of March.
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The earl of March was by this stage a man in his sixties (born c.1282) who had played a quiet role during the Steward's lieutenancy. Nonetheless, it is likely that David viewed Earl Patrick as having taken advantage of the royal absence to further his own landed interests. More than that, Dunbar and the Steward were doubly damned in David's eyes for their submissions in the 1330s to Edward Balliol and Edward III. March, who had received no rewards from Robert I for entering his peace c. or betraying the Balliol conspiracy of 1320, certainly joined the Anglo-Balliol occupation regime between 1332 and 1335. 14 March rejoined the Bruce Scots around the time that the Steward seems to have negotiated protection for his lands by entering Edward III's peace (until perhaps as late as 1338).
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To absolve them for their brief defections, David seems to have issued both the Steward and March with a general pardon and confirmation of their lands c.1341-2. 16 However, in doing so the king probably exploited the high moral ground to continue to exclude these magnates from royal favour and in several instances to punish them further by depriving them of some lands. The Steward's pardon noticeably excluded confirmation of the valuable lands of Bathgate and Ratho in Lothian which reverted to the Crown; in 1342 the Steward may also have been obliged by the king to resign the lands of Enoch in Dumfriesshire to the crusader and Perthshire knight, Sir Robert Menzies, to whom David would also later give lands in Dull, Perthshire, surely denting there the interests of the Steward (1343-6). In this manner, by spring 1342 David had quite effectively signalled the return of an active adult king to Scotland and begun to assert the Crown's dominance. Typically he backed up his grants with personal energy, making ayres ranging from the fringes of the south-west (Middlebie and Mousewald) to Inverness and Moray in the north, and back and forth frequently between Edinburgh and Dumbarton. However, it is clear that some regions remained beyond David's control and that his moves to shift the balance of power within these areas of Scotland in his favour provoked an early magnate backlash. 22 But in the longer term, Douglas found himself frozen out, his kin deprived of their control of the royal castles and sheriff offices in Edinburgh, Perth and (briefly) Teviotdale in favour of royal household knights.
23
David was able through patronage and his personal leadership of raids on northern England -and his interest in chivalry and the crusades in general -to win the service of most of Dalhousie's followers. Chron. Fordun, ii, Chron. Wyntoun, vi, Chron. Bower (Watt), vii, RRS, vi, nos. 126, 175, 210, 351, 361, 373; RMS, i, nos. 192, 267, 282, 297, 331, 346, and App. ii, nos. 809, 921, 1388, 1563; ER, i, 583, 591, and ii, 112-4, 129, 333, 358; CDS, iii, no. 1576; Rot. Scot., i, 797 App. ii, nos. 908, 941, 959, 967, 986, 1016 App. ii, nos. 908, 941, 959, 967, 986, , 1068 App. ii, nos. 908, 941, 959, 967, 986, , 1104 App. ii, nos. 908, 941, 959, 967, 986, , 1127 App. ii, nos. 908, 941, 959, 967, 986, , 1130 RRS, vi, nos. 93-5. 31 RMS, i, no. 196 ; ER, i, 499-542 passim. Buttergask had been sheriff of Perth c.1334. 32 RRS, vi, nos. 75, 212, 327; Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, [16] [17] [18] [19] Fraser, Menteith, i, 34 Yet even when the Fifes produced a daughter, Isabella, possibly nullifying the 1315 tailzie, the Steward may still have held out hope of marrying into a family which would have further strengthened his claim to the Scottish throne (and given him a thin claim to England's).
T H E S C O T S A T T H E B A T T L E O F N E V I L L E ' S C R O S S

H E S C O T S A T T H E B A T T L E O F N E V I L L E ' S C R O S S
Under the events of the years c.1358-60, the English chronicler Sir Thomas Gray -a captive in Scotland during the Steward's lieutenancy c.1355 -asserts not only that the 1315 tailzie was to come into force if Earl Duncan died without a male heir, but that it was intended that Duncan's daughter, Isabella should be sold to Robert the Steward of Scotland [for a wife] but she married for love William de Felton, a knight of Northumberland [d. c.1358] , who was her guardian at the time, and she laid claim to the earldom which had been renounced by that contract.
Although c.1359-60 Isabella would return to Scotland and wed the Steward's second son, Walter, it is possible that in the 1330s and 1340s the Steward had hoped to wed her himself, perhaps as a way of getting round the fact that David had decided c.1341-6 to name an alternative assignee to Fife. 37 But most telling of all, the king was already favouring the two crusading knights whom he would set up successively as earls of Fife after 1357: namely William Ramsay of Colluthie, to whom (as noted earlier) David gave valuable lands in Lothian and the sheriffship of Edinburgh in the 1340s and whom he would impose as earl of Fife in 1358; and Thomas Bisset of Upsetlington, to whom David gave the thanage of Aboyne in Aberdeenshire in the 1340s and would force Isabella of Fife to wed in 1363 (adding to the Stewarts' motives for rebellion in that year). 38 In the 1340s, then, David clearly sought to deny the Steward his landed succession rights. However, more controversially still, the king may already have become anxious to deny the Steward as his heir presumptive to the kingship, a goal which would obsess David after 1346. Abbot Bower and much later Hector Boece assert that by the late 1350s David wanted to nominate a new royal heir presumptive in John, born sometime in 1346-7, son of William, Earl of Sutherland and David's sister Margaret Bruce (who had been wed about 1342): indeed, John's birth may have been a factor in the Steward's request for a papal legitimation. 39 Unlike the Steward -born to Robert I's daughter Marjorie, David II's half-sisterJohn Sutherland was a full nephew of the king. There is no evidence that David attempted to pass a fresh Act of Succession through Parliament to retailzie the kingship after June 1344, a period for which the parliamentary record is missing. But the possibility that David did intend to set up the Sutherlands as an alternative heir presumptive line to the Stewarts may be indicated by the largesse shown by the Crown by 1346 to Earl William and his son: this included a regality for Sutherland itself as well as several valuable thanages and baronies in north-eastern Scotland and around Mar -Kincardine, Aberluthnot and Cluny. 40 Sutherland's support against the predatory and expansionist William, Earl of Ross, would also have been welcomed by the Crown. 41 The territorial grants to Sutherland undoubtedly served to counter-balance the lands given to the Ross family by Robert I in the far north and north-east. 42 Thus David's brother-in-law may have had some role to play In several ways, then, the Parliament of June 1344 can be seen as a watershed for David II, John Randolph and their close supporters. The Crown had asserted its will with parliamentary legitimation of the fate of the earldom of Strathearn and the vital justiciarship of Scotia. David now had his choice of officer in the key sheriffships and keeperships of royal castles of the realm and, on paper at least, his widespread patronage amounted to an effective check on the territorial ambitions of the self-made men of the 1330s. For magnates like the Steward, March, Ross and Fife -and, after Spring 1342, the obviously chastened William Douglas, Lord of Liddesdale -the royal court was an uncomfortable, intimidating arena, dominated by David and his favoured nobles, bureaucratic clerics and household knights, men for whom the king in contrast must have represented a figure of generosity and stable authority.
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Standard tests suggest David's royal government increased in effectiveness with the passage of time after June 1341. Royal revenue rose: for example, Andrew Buttergask, sheriff of Perth after the removal of Andrew Douglas from that office, took £142 from the shire for 1343 as opposed to £94 in 1342; £545 was collected as the fermes of Edinburgh in 1343 -as opposed to £112 in 1342 -after the removal of another Douglas in charge there. 46 Royal control of the justiciar ayres might also have boosted David's coffers in 1344-6. David's own court and Parliament also seemed to provide an effective forum for justice with the king himself overseeing the settlement of several magnate disputes with enforced marriages and land deals. 47 Admittedly, royal income from sensitive areas like the south-west, west coast and far north remained low. But the maturing monarch must have begun to assume a convincing persona as fount of justice and patronage and as Scotland's energetic leader in war, a figure that many Scots found increasingly attractive.
Andrew Wyntoun, a chronicler favourable to the Stewarts, nonetheless employs an anonymous source which depicts David in a favourable light at this time:
Often justyng, dansing and playing He raid with faire court throu all his land chevalrous and worthy
1 7 3 45 Thomson, 'A roll of the Scottish Parliament, 1344', 238; RRS, vi, nos. 85, 99 (Sir William Abernethy given lands in Banffshire). 46 ER, i, passim. Royal income was still very low, though -in June 1342 the Chamberlain (William Bullock, just before his removal) intromited just £2,529 and Edinburgh's shire was 'waste' that year. There are no extant Exchequer Accounts from mid-1343 to c.1353x7. 47 CPR, iii, 27, 286, 331. stout young and joly, And yarnyt for to se fechting 48 David had arguably already shown the 'raddure' -the strong personal authority necessary to control subjects -with which Wyntoun's source would credit his rule between 1357 and 1371. Similarly, Walter Bower insisted that by the eve of the 1346 campaign, the king of Scots was 'fully reassured and supported by the knightly young men of military age'. 49 However, against this apparent popularity for the returned monarch has to be set the fallout from the Crown's policy of challenging some of its greater subjects' landed and dynastic interests to reassert its own. As Michael Lynch suggests, here there may have been 'signs, less of troublesome magnates, than an inability on the part of an inexperienced King to keep a range of noble interests in balance'. 50 Wyntoun's source certainly was aware of the discriminating nature of David's patronage:
Agayne the stout rycht stowt was he; Til sympil he schewit gret debonerte. He gaf to gud men largely And walde mak sa prewaly His gift, that he walde lat nane wit, Be hym til qwham he walde gif it. And unaskyt he gaf oftysis The gift was the fer mar to pryse. Throw gewyn and debonerte His menys hartis til hym wan he. 51 In this context, the behaviour of the Steward, March and Ross in 1346 should have come as absolutely no surprise to David; any hope that they may have had of reward from David's reign must have been long since obliterated -the king had pushed them too far.
In fact, although many benefited from his favour, David's confrontational approach can be said to have added to the disruption and internal rivalries of the Scottish community after the English occupation and intensive war of clearance of the 1330s. In Parliament in June 1344 David also had to bind over the followers of William Douglas of Liddesdale and those of the late Alexander Ramsay (many of whom had entered the royal following) to cease their feuding in the Lothians and marches: the Steward and the earls of Fife, March, Wigtown and Sutherland were named among the cautioners for this peace. 52 Ross's feud against the Mackenzies and MacRuaries in the north and north-west, Sutherland's against the MacKays in the same area, and the Stewarts' and Campbells' against the MacDonalds and Drummonds in western and central Scotland, had undeniably been further aggravated by David's land resettlement and rumbled on, worsening into the 1350s. Walter Bower notably spoke of accusations that David's negligence had led to Ramsay's murder, an event Fordun's contemporary source lamented as meaning that:
… feuds and misunderstandings, undying -as it were -and endless arose in the Kingdom, not only among the lords, but even among the common people; so that thenceforth, they murdered each other with mutual slaughter, and slew each other with the sword. 53 This must have made for an atmosphere of unremitting tension at public gatherings or other collective dealings.
For example, in spring 1344 -just before the momentous Parliament of that year -a pretender Alexander Bruce appeared in Scotland claiming to be the man who had died at Halidon Hill (1333) and laid claim to the earldom of Carrick and other lands as the bastard of Edward Bruce. It is tempting to speculate that this pretender may also have claimed some place in the succession to the Bruce kingship especially if David had cast further doubts over the Stewarts since June 1341. Yet the swiftness with which the Scottish chroniclers report that David was obliged to have this claimant executed in July 1344 at Ayr (after the key Parliament of that year) to placate the land fears of the Steward, Malcolm Fleming, Earl of Wigtown, and others (despite there being 'clear evidence' alleged to substantiate the man's claim) is suggestive of the potentially explosive domestic climate at this time. 54 
*
The events of the preceding five years must, then, be taken into account for any understanding of the Scottish campaign of 1346. With an awareness of the potential for intensifying personal and factional animosities within the Scottish political community -either in Parliament or at an armed host -it could be said that much of the outcome of David's first invasion en masse of England was predictable.
Whilst he lay asleep with his followers at Elcho monastery as the northern part of the host assembled, Ranald MacRuarie, the island lord most favoured by David II, was murdered by his local enemy, a noble repeatedly diminished by the Crown, William Earl of Ross. According to some chroniclers, despite William Douglas's ironic insistence that the campaign be halted while David deal with this murderer, the army headed south on a
dirty, scrappy chévauchée of the western and central marches of England (although it is possible it did so after David had reached some pardon deal with Ross who withdrew in shame). Some chroniclers then assert that after the capture of the peel of Liddale in Cumberland, William Douglaswhose lordship in Scotland would have benefited most from the removal of this English stronghold -again urged that David turn back. Further uneasy tremors are provided by the contrast between English writers' insistence that David had the captain of Liddale executed unshriven whilst Wyntoun and Bower portray David's dismissal of the veteran Douglas's advice as the error of an inexperienced, impatient general. 55 David must, though, have had his heart set on making a very definite statement with this campaign. Not only did he desire to repay a debt to Philip VI of France -whose pleading letters for a Scottish attack had arrived with David before the French defeat at Créci (August 1346) -but the king must have seen this as an opportunity to impress his royal authority on all his subjects. Thomas Sampson, an English cleric who reported the result of the battle to his superior, described David as encamping near Durham in 'tents and pavillions of the richest and noblest sort'. 56 If so, this was very definitely to be a royal campaign -almost a progress -and not a traditional guerrilla raid in the style of Robert Bruce, Thomas Randpolph and James Douglas, even though in September and early October 1346, David's army did extract tribute and supplies from several regions in northern England. David's veneration of a Rood of St Margaret (although probably not the original Black Rood, nonetheless held to be a relic of Christ's Holy Cross) as an emblem for his host also points to his desire to exploit the prestige of this campaign. 57 In the same way -if Alexander Grant's persuasive breakdown of the Scottish divisions is correct -David's deployment of the Steward and March to lead the third and rearguard division when battle was joined in the Bearpark on 17 October may also have been a calculated statement, designed to put his main domestic opponent firmly in his place. The Steward and March led a company of probably 2-3,000 lightly armoured In short, the deserters must have known exactly what they were doing when they withdrew. They had perhaps already seen John Randolph, Maurice Murray and others killed as well as several other Scots magnates captured. The Steward (who would never cross the Border in arms again) must have felt his heart leap at the thought that he might now inherit Menteith, Strathearn, Fife and, of course, the kingship. Patrick, Earl of March, could now look to inherit title to Moray (which he did by 1357) and perhaps exploit William Douglas's capture along with many Lothian men. 60 All three deserters -the Steward, March and Ross -would exploit ruthlessly the power vacuums resulting from the battle casualties along with William, Lord of Douglas (Liddesdale's nephew, who returned from exile in France c.1348). After 1357 mounting tension between David and his supporters on the one hand and the Steward, March, Ross and the lord (by 1358 the first earl) of Douglas on the other would focus on lands, offices and matters first disputed before 1346: the earldoms of Fife, Strathearn and Menteith, the justiciarships, various sheriffships and the royal succession. 61 Further evidence that the dynastic and territorial tensions between David and key magnates had been at the heart of the Scots defeat in 1346 can later be found in chronicle treatments of the battle. As already noted, Fordun's source -by a contemporary of David II's reign -openly condemned the three deserters, as did some of the English writers who may have heard a version of events from David and other Scots captured on that day and lodged in England well into the 1350s. Certainly, David and his supporters would indulge in a rewriting of the unpalatable events of that day through their discussions with Jean Froissart, the Hainault chronicler recommended to David II by Edward III's queen, Philippa; Froissart stayed with the Scottish king and some Scots magnates for several months in 1365. 62 In Froissart's version, what in reality had been an inglorious Scottish campaign riven with internal tensions became a chivalric exemplum. No mention is made of the role of the Steward, March or Ross in 1346. Instead, prominence is given to David and his close supporters from the 1340s and his 'second kingship' of the 1360s; they are joined at the muster by famous hearty knights from 'Sweden, Norway and Denmark' with the heir and namesake of the great military tutor Alexander Ramsay (who became a celebrated knight in his own right in the 1380s) named as royal standard-bearer. Froissart ascribes David a loyal host of 40,000 men
